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Abstract 
The goal of this project is to analyze the factors that contribute to the gender discrepancy 
in labor force participation rates around the world. This paper will explore potential drivers of 
the gender disparity phenomenon through the analyzation of country-specific elements to detect 
related impacts that may be imposed on a country’s composition of labor force as it relates to 
gender. More specifically, I interpret the degree to which specific factors can directly influence 
the proportion of female presence in labor forces around the world. My empirical results suggest 
that the societal factors, legal regulations, culture, total fertility rate (births per woman) are all 
determinants of female labor force participation rates by country. My results confirm theoretical 
and economic theories, as well as findings from existing literature. It is of upmost importance to 
study these relationships as they explain much of the labor force participation rates around the 
world.  
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1. Introduction 
Labor force participation rates have been in a global decline for both men and women - but 
this decline has been particularly accentuated for women. (World Economic Forum, 2017) 
Women compose one-half of the world’s population and therefore their equal participation in the 
labor force, alongside an equal share of men, is fundamental to whether and how economies and 
societies survive. Despite recent advances towards lessening the global gender gap, it remains 
apparent that women are significantly underrepresented within labor force participation rates on 
a global scale. As a result, the full integration of women into the talent pool has become a must. 
The list of barriers to female representation in business is analogous to the list of barriers to 
female labor force participation rates. If labor force participation rates are high for women, then 
more women will be working and should eventually enter corporate boardrooms if there are no 
other barriers to female leadership. This suggests that economic and cultural factors may be 
important barriers to female career advancement. In turn, we must ensure the healthy 
development and appropriate use of half of the world’s total talent pool as it holds a vast bearing 
on the growth, competitiveness, and future readiness of economies and businesses worldwide. 
This paper will examine various cultural aspects and social norms country-by-country, 
further analyzing the extent in which they may explain the variation in global labor force 
participation rates for women. The use of culture in finance literature has been well established 
overtime. Our study adds to the existing literature by further investigating the international 
aspect of this research. The behavioral patterns of women ultimately determine their subsequent 
career path decisions, those of which are impacted by various societal factors as well as 
upbringing culture. With this, our study fills the gap by using cross-country cultural differences 
in explaining the behavior of women in choosing careers. To adequately assess shocks to female 
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labor participation rates on a country-by-country basis, we must analyze the effects of several 
fundamental components, including differences within the following areas: cultural dimensions 
and subsequent norms, legal restrictions and regulations, demographics, and population 
distributions. I also consider additional country factors such as organizational structure, 
maternity leave policy, education level and several other world development indicators to 
collectively explain the discrepancy in gender representation. 
Several general hypotheses explain these differences; however, the research community 
still does not completely understand how to combat this problem. Mainly, I hypothesize that 
cultural norms and values around the world determine the behavior of women in choosing 
varying career paths and their subsequent decision to actively participate in the global labor 
force. Finally, I propose my related models as means of improving this disparity and increasing 
the female participation in the economy.   
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Gender Diversity and Economic Efficiency 
A growing body of literature points to the relationship between female labor force and 
economic growth. The World Bank’s 2012 World Development Report argues that gender 
equality matters in its own right, but that it is also “smart economics” because it can enhance 
economic efficiency. (World Bank, 2012) The World Economic Forum’s 2014 Global Gender 
Gap Report finds a positive correlation between gender equality and per capita GDP, the level of 
competitiveness, and human development indicators. (World Economic Forum, 2014) 
A variety of models and empirical studies have suggested that improving gender parity may 
result in significant economic dividends, which vary depending on the situation of different 
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economies and the specific challenges they are facing. Notable recent estimates suggest that 
economic gender parity could add an additional US$250 billion to the GDP of the United 
Kingdom, US$1,750 billion to that of the United States, US$550 billion to Japan’s, US$320 
billion to France’s and US$310 billion to the GDP of Germany. Other recent estimates suggest 
that China could see a US$2.5 trillion GDP increase from gender parity and that the world as a 
whole could increase global GDP by US$5.3 trillion by 2025 by closing the gender gap in 
economic participation by 25% over the same period. (World Economic Forum, 2017) 
Gender-diversity may hold positive impacts within a board’s level of efficiency and its 
associated firm performance. However, results in existing literature are not conclusive. In Spain, 
gender-diversity has a positive effect on firm value and the opposite causal relation is 
insignificant.  (Campbell & Mínguez-Vera) Studies using data at one or two points in time find 
that gender diversity in boards is associated with higher stock values and greater profitability. 
However, studies using panel data over a number of years, which explore the effects of adding 
women to boards, generally show no effects or negative effects. This suggests that the 
association between board diversity and performance in cross-sectional studies is simply 
explained as a consequence of the fact that successful firms appoint women to their boards. 
(Dobbin & Jung, 2011) However, on the positive side, one study (Smith, Smith, & Verner, 2004) 
showed that the proportion of women in top management jobs tends to have positive effects 
on firm performance, even after controlling for numerous characteristics of the firm and 
direction of causality. The results also showed that the positive effects of women in top 
management strongly depend on the qualifications of female top managers. Despite a 
significant number of studies conducted on various aspects of board diversity as they relate to 
board effectiveness, the debate on conclusive effects is still ongoing. Scholars have assumed that 
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if board diversity affects corporate performance, it is through its influence on group processes in 
the board room. (Dobbin & Jung, 2011)  
2.2 The Role of Culture 
 
Culture plays a significant role in the evolution of women’s careers. For example, if family 
values are strong then it may be difficult for women to accept more demanding positions. 
Women may also be passed over for promotion because of the perception that women are not 
natural leaders. A growing literature argues that culture has an important role to play in 
explaining female work outcomes. (Olivetti & Goldin, 2013) argued that female labor force 
participation increased substantially after World War II because it led to changes in attitudes 
towards working women (Fernández & Fogli, 2009) also argue that culture matters and use 
characteristics of the countries of (Insight Report The Global Gender Gap Report 2013) origin 
for US immigrants, such as female labor supply, to proxy for culture. 
The many varying aspects of cultural diversity contains both positive and negative effects 
depending on its specific area of focus. The management literature generally identifies cultural 
diversity as a “double-edged sword” (Milliken & Martins, 1996), recognizing both positive and 
negative aspects that come from cultural diversity. Findings have indicated that cultural diversity 
in boards can have a negative impact on firm performance (measured with Tobin’s Q and ROA), 
with the degree of impact determined by the size and complexity of the observed firm. (Frijns, 
Dodd, & Cimerova, 2016) Overall, complex firms experience increased levels of cultural 
diversity which further increases the potential of negative impacts to firm performance. As such, 
these negative impacts may be mitigated by smaller firms with a minimal amount of foreign 
sales and operations. Despite the potential of complex firms to be more culturally-diverse and 
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correspondingly produce negative levels of performance these same complex environments can 
paradoxically provide an increased opportunity for female inclusion in the work force.  
Interestingly, boards that operate within complex environments are also more likely to have 
gender-balanced boards as compared to others. (Terjesen, Couto, & Morais, 2016) 
The role of culture on financial decision has gained wide acceptance in the finance literature 
in more recent years. County specific cultural norms impact behavior of managers in corporate 
decision making, in choosing mergers and acquisitions, in cross-border cooperation and in 
establishing subsidiaries in foreign countries. Culture impacts the behavior of individual 
investors, as research shows that in highly individualistic society’s stock markets generate 
greater return. As a result, this overconfidence in stock market outcome leads to higher trading 
activity and momentum around the world. 
There are many ways to measure the role of culture and the most popular one is the measure 
created by Professor Geert Hofstede. Based on his definition, culture is “the collective 
programming of the mind distinguishing the members of one group or category of people from 
others.” Culture is a broad variable that takes several dimensions – individualism, masculinity, 
confidence, power distance, long term orientation and uncertainty avoidance. The main variables 
of interest are as follows: Power Distance Index (PDI), Individualism vs. Collectivism (IND), 
Masculinity vs. Femininity (MAS), Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI), and Long-term 
Orientation vs. Short-term Normative Orientation (LTO). These explanatory variables are 
detailed within my dataset under Section 5.4 – Hofstede: Six Dimensions of National Culture. 
Each cultural dimension is represented by a score which is backed by extensive survey type 
research performed by IBM in 70 countries (Hofstede uses the first 40 countries with the largest 
numbers of respondents). Hofstede’s cultural framework has been used extensively in research in 
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recent years to help explain differences in performance rates for businesses of all kinds. 
Hofstede’s framework, when applied to these measures, includes aspects of cultural differences 
that are not equally important once considered as explanations used for describing certain 
statistical phenomena.  
2.3 The Role of Imposed Quotas and Country Regulations  
Another topic for debate in determining female participation highlights the use of quotas and 
regulations imposed on a country for gender equity attainment reasons. The introduction of 
female quotas in Italy in the 1990s tripled the probability of voting for women (De Paola & 
Scoppa, 2010) and increased female representation in politic (Bonomi, Brosio, & Di Tommaso, 
2013). (Kang, 2013) found that the success of gender quota laws in Niger depended on the 
design of the law, the institutional context, and having female activists monitoring its 
application. The perceived notion concerning gender quotas most often accredits an achievement 
of superior levels of gender proportion directly to strength in regulation levels for a country. 
Contrarily, the issue can become quite paradoxical and as a result, proves to be a dilemma that is 
increasingly far reaching. 
In 2014, only 20% of directorships on average were held by female directors in the largest 
European companies, with an important heterogeneity across countries. These further 
supplement gender inequality statistics as they point towards an overwhelming 
underrepresentation of females and their inclusion within most labor force sectors across the 
globe, especially within leadership positions and higher levels of business and finance. As a 
result, improving board-level gender diversity has become a global agenda that aims to promote 
gender equality in our societies. This “global agenda” is commonly perceived as an efficient 
means for increasing firm accountability and improving performance through better corporate 
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governance. (Rebérioux & Roudaut, 2016) Unfortunately, this link is not so straightforward, 
especially regarding quotas. For example, in 2008 the Norwegian experience completed the first 
implementation of a gender quota and provided results inconsistent with their hypothesis as they 
further demonstrated a negative relationship between gender diversity and firm performance. 
(Storvik & Teigen, 2010) 
Quotas have shown inconsistent results across countries as they have been noted within a 
vast amount of research globally. Highlighting Sweden and Finland as primary examples, 
corresponding data per country revealed boards had achieved successes in board diversity 
without the use of quotas.  Both countries contained top ranking values for female representation 
on boards and paradoxically contained zero targets regarding the improvement of gender 
diversity. (Kamonjoh, 2014) When looking at within-board effects rather than between, other 
studies have provided conflicting results concerning the effectiveness of gender quotas. Within 
French boards, quotas have successfully opened the doors of boardrooms to new, unseasoned 
females and have distinctive characteristics that set them apart from other board members. 
Additionally, this influx of women into French boards were all subjects that – whether a 
seasoned female or not – experienced an inner glass ceiling with “positional” gender segregation. 
This also resulted in an associated gender fee gap of 5% due to the amplification of the 
segregation process from the imposed quotas alone. Although these quotas have helped women 
enter the boardroom, it has not succeeded in preventing positional gender segregation within 
board composition. (Frijns & Dodd, 2014) The Institutional Shareholder Services further 
analyzed the average gender diversity on boards at companies in 30 countries around 5 
continents. This study compared the differences between genders and further conducted an 
analysis on its various related drivers, including regulation as a primary explanatory variable. 
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(Kamonjoh, 2014) Results reveal that levels of gender diversity are disproportionate across 
countries and intrinsically encompass supplementary variables that should be accounted for in 
order to more accurately explain the variation amongst labor participation ratios between genders 
across cultures.  
Many believe incorporating a maternity leave policy can aid in increasing the rate of 
females in the labor force. While maternity leave policies can support female labor force 
participation rates (Jaumotte, 2003), it also has a non-linear effect on labor force participation 
rate when accounting for the duration of leave. (Edin & Gustavsson, 2008) Independent of 
duration, maternity leave has a negative effect on the gender gap (Thévenon & Solaz, 2013). 
Additionally, the presence of a maternity leave policy that is long in duration as compared to a 
paternity leave policy that is short in duration (or entirely non-existent) can encourage employer 
discrimination (Mandel & Semyonov, 2005) As such, cultures need policies with a greater parity 
between the maternity leave and paternity leave. 
Keeping these disparities in mind, it is apparent that not all regulation is equal in terms of 
its efficiency for increasing female participation country-by-country. As such, this is a far-
reaching dilemma and entails additional variables beyond a country’s presence of mandatory 
quotas as primary means for achieving gender diversity on a global scale. As such, the question 
remains whether a society’s differing cultural aspects can provide advantageous economic 
impacts that may further reflect social trends towards assuring gender equity in labor force 
participation rates. 
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2.4 The Role of Societal Norms 
Social norms in various markets often drive the regulatory framework for a country entirely. 
(Kamonjoh, 2014) Societal factors help determine an initial base line for the prosperity level of 
an economy. The underlying societal factors serve as a comparison tool across countries and help 
gauge a county’s “economic success” by way of statistical measurements within the components 
of gross domestic product, economic opportunity, health, educational attainment, political 
empowerment, and global gender gap score ranking. There is a sizable literature showing that 
gender inequalities in education and employment opportunities come at a cost. They not only 
deprive the women of basic freedoms (Sen, 1999), but negatively affect development outcomes 
for the whole society. They can lead to ill-health, low overall human capital, bad governance, 
and lower economic growth (Abu-Ghaida & Klasen, 2004).  
Using the Social Institution and Gender Index (SIGI), (Branisa & Klasen, 2013) indicated 
that institutions with gender inequality results in lower females in secondary education, higher 
fertility rates per women, higher child mortality rates, and a greater perception of corruption in a 
respective country. Additionally, weak or restrictive laws related to family, gender-based 
violence and economic opportunities are most likely to impede women’s empowerment. (Gaye, 
Klugman, Kovacevis, Twigg, & Zambrano, 2010) These findings provide adequate support for 
why we should look deeper into the aspects of social norms for a country such as educational 
attainment, fertility rates, and overall gender gaps. 
 Most studies have emphasized the importance of education in models of female labor 
supply. (Eckstein & Lifshitz, 2011) estimate a dynamic stochastic female labor supply model 
with discrete choice and find that changes in education (accounting for a third of the increase in 
female employment) and wages, explaining about 20%, play a large role in explaining female 
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employment. As such, educational attainment has a positive correlation with female labor 
participation rates. Additionally, higher female work force participation would also result in a 
more skilled labor force, in view of women's higher education levels. (Steinberg & Nakane) 
Fertility rate has been proven through time to have a significant impact on the composition of 
female labor force. However, the effect is either positive or negative depending on the level of 
observation. At the individual level, fertility rate has a negative impact to female labor supply for 
a country. For example, (Mishra & Smyth, 2010) indicated that a 1% increase in fertility rate 
results in a decrease in the female labor force participation rate by 0.4%. On the other side, at the 
cross-country level, fertility rate has a positive impact to female labor supply. (De Laat & 
Sevilla-Sanz, 2010) explain why this difference appears at the cross-country level and accredits it 
to a finding on men’s home production.  Their study found that women living in countries where 
men participate more in home production are better able to combine having children with market 
work, leading to greater participation in the labor force at relatively high fertility levels. Within 
each country however, women with higher relative wages continue to have lower fertility and to 
participate more in the labor force than lower-paid women due to the higher opportunity cost of 
remaining at home.  
Given these contributing factors, instances of occupational gender imbalances reflect, on the 
one hand, the societal expectations and role models that contribute to educational and field of 
study choices young girls and boys make when they embark upon acquiring foundational 
competencies and, on the other hand, women and men’s career planning trajectories as well as 
the dynamics of hiring imbalances across industries. (World Economic Forum, 2017) 
As of 2017, the World Economic Forum found the gaps between women and men on 
economic participation and political empowerment remain wide: only 58% of the economic 
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participation gap has been closed—a second consecutive year of reversed progress and the 
lowest value measured by the Index since 2008—and about 23% of the political gap, unchanged 
since last year against a long-term trend of slow but steady improvement. Alongside slowed 
growth in global economic participation, the overall gap in gender across all sectors has 
additionally grown, exhibiting poor performance within the Gender Gap Index across countries 
when weighted by population. In 2017, the average progress on closing the global gender gap 
stands at a score of 0.680—which means that an average gap of 32% remains to be closed 
worldwide across the four Index dimensions to achieve universal gender parity. Last year that 
gap was slightly smaller with the average of 31.7%. 
 
3. Dataset 
3.1 World Development Indicator (WDI) 
 
Fertility rate, total (births per woman): Total fertility rate represents the number of 
children that would be born to a woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing 
years and bear children in accordance with age-specific fertility rates of the specified year. 
3.2 Country Size Indicator 
 
Ln(GDP) (Current US$): GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all 
resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not 
included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data 
are in current U.S. dollars. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic currencies 
using single year official exchange rates. For a few countries where the official exchange rate 
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does not reflect the rate effectively applied to actual foreign exchange transactions, an 
alternative conversion factor is used. I took the natural log of GDP in order for the large 
numerical value to fit more closely within the model and other independent variables.  
3.3 Civil Indicator 
Rule of Law: Rule of Law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard 
normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5. 
3.4 Hofstede: Six Dimensions of National Culture 
Power Distance Index: This dimension expresses the degree to which the less powerful 
members of a society accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. The fundamental 
issue here is how a society handles inequalities among people. People in societies exhibiting 
a large degree of Power Distance accept a hierarchical order in which everybody has a place 
and which needs no further justification. In societies with low Power Distance, people strive 
to equalize the distribution of power and demand justification for inequalities of power. 
Individualism vs. Collectivism: The high side of this dimension, called Individualism, can 
be defined as a preference for a loosely-knit social framework in which individuals are 
expected to take care of only themselves and their immediate families. Its opposite, 
Collectivism, represents a preference for a tightly-knit framework in society in which 
individuals can expect their relatives or members of a particular ingroup to look after them in 
exchange for unquestioning loyalty. A society’s position on this dimension is reflected in 
whether people’s self-image is defined in terms of “I” or “we.” 
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Masculinity vs. Femininity: The Masculinity side of this dimension represents a preference 
in society for achievement, heroism, assertiveness, and material rewards for success. Society 
at large is more competitive. Its opposite, Femininity, stands for a preference for cooperation, 
modesty, caring for the weak and quality of life. Society at large is more consensus-oriented. 
In the business context Masculinity versus Femininity is sometimes also related to as “tough 
versus tender” cultures. 
Uncertainty Avoidance Index: The Uncertainty Avoidance dimension expresses the degree 
to which the members of a society feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity. The 
fundamental issue here is how a society deals with the fact that the future can never be 
known: should we try to control the future or just let it happen? Countries exhibiting strong 
UAI maintain rigid codes of belief and behavior, and are intolerant of unorthodox behavior 
and ideas. Weak UAI societies maintain a more relaxed attitude in which practice counts 
more than principles. 
Long-term Orientation vs. Short-term Normative Orientation: Every society has to 
maintain some links with its own past while dealing with the challenges of the present and 
the future. Societies prioritize these two existential goals differently. Societies who score low 
on this dimension, for example, prefer to maintain time-honored traditions and norms while 
viewing societal change with suspicion. Those with a culture which scores high, on the other 
hand, take a more pragmatic approach: they encourage thrift and efforts in modern education 
as a way to prepare for the future. In the business context, this dimension is referred to as 
“(short-term) normative versus (long-term) pragmatic” (PRA). In the academic environment, 
the terminology Monumentalism versus Flexhumility is sometimes also used. 
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Indulgence vs. Restraint: Indulgence stands for a society that allows relatively free 
gratification of basic and natural human drives related to enjoying life and having fun. 
Restraint stands for a society that suppresses gratification of needs and regulates it by means 
of strict social norms 
3.5 Quota Indicators (Binary Variables) 
Law mandates equal remuneration for females and males for work of equal value 
(1=yes; 0=no): Law mandates equal remuneration for females and males for work of equal 
value is whether there is a law that obligates employers to pay equal remuneration to male 
and female employees who do work of equal value. “Remuneration” refers to the ordinary, 
basic or minimum wage or salary and any additional emoluments payable directly or 
indirectly, whether in cash or in kind, by the employer to the worker and arising out of the 
worker’s employment. “Work of equal value” refers not only to the same or similar jobs but 
also to different jobs of the same value. 
Mothers are guaranteed an equivalent position after maternity leave (1=yes; 0=no): 
Mothers are guaranteed an equivalent position after maternity leave is whether employers of 
women returning from maternity leave are legally obligated to provide them with an 
equivalent position after maternity leave. It takes into account paid and unpaid maternity 
leave and captures whether the employer has a legal obligation to reinstate the returning 
employee in an equivalent or better position and salary than the employee had pre-leave. 
Where the maternity leave regime explicitly states that the employee may not be indefinitely 
replaced, the answer is assumed to be “Yes.” Where the maternity leave regime explicitly 
establishes a suspension of the employee’s contract, the answer is assumed to be “Yes.” In 
economies that also have parental leave and the law guarantees return after the leave to the 
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same or an equivalent position paid at the same rate but is silent on guaranteeing the same 
position after maternity leave, the answer is “Yes.” The answer is “N/A” if no paid or unpaid 
maternity leave is available. 
3.6 World Economic Forum Indicators (WEF) – Global Gender Gap Report 2017 
Global Gender Gap: The Global Gender Gap Index examines the gap between men and 
women in four fundamental categories (sub-indexes): Economic Participation and 
Opportunity, Educational Attainment, Health and Survival and Political Empowerment. The 
Global Gender Gap Index was first introduced by the World Economic Forum in 2006 as a 
framework for capturing the magnitude of gender-based disparities and tracking their 
progress over time. The Index benchmarks national gender gaps on economic, education, 
health and political criteria, and provides country rankings that allow for effective 
comparisons across regions and income groups. The rankings are designed to create global 
awareness of the challenges posed by gender gaps and the opportunities created by reducing 
them. 
Economic Participation and Opportunity: This sub index contains three concepts: the 
participation gap, the remuneration gap and the advancement gap. The participation gap is 
captured using the difference between women and men in labor force participation rates. The 
remuneration gap is captured through a hard data indicator (ratio of estimated female-to-male 
earned income) and a qualitative indicator gathered through the World Economic Forum’s 
annual Executive Opinion Survey (wage equality for similar work). Finally, the gap between 
the advancement of women and men is captured through two hard data statistics (the ratio of 
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women to men among legislators, senior officials and managers, and the ratio of women to 
men among technical and professional workers). 
Educational Attainment: This sub index captures the gap between women’s and men’s 
current access to education through ratios of women to men in primary-, secondary- and 
tertiary-level education. A longer-term view of the country’s ability to educate women and 
men in equal numbers is captured through the ratio of the female literacy rate to the male 
literacy rate. 
 Health and Survival: This sub index provides an overview of the differences between 
women’s and men’s health using two indicators. The first is the sex ratio at birth, which aims 
specifically to capture the phenomenon of “missing women”, prevalent in many countries 
with a strong son preference. Second, we use the gap between women’s and men’s healthy 
life expectancy. This measure provides an estimate of the number of years that women and 
men can expect to live in good health by taking into account the years lost to violence, 
disease, malnutrition and other relevant factors. 
Political Empowerment: This sub index measures the gap between men and women at the 
highest level of political decision-making through the ratio of women to men in ministerial 
positions and the ratio of women to men in parliamentary positions. In addition, we’ve 
included the ratio of women to men in terms of years in executive office (prime minister or 
president) for the last 50 years. A clear drawback in this category is the absence of any 
indicators capturing differences between the participation of women and men at local levels 
of government. Should such data become available at a globally comparative level in future 
years, it will be considered for inclusion in the Index. 
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3.7 Dependent Variable 
Labor force participation rate, female (% of female population ages 15+): Labor force 
participation rate is the proportion of the population ages 15 and older that is economically 
active: all people who supply labor for the production of goods and services during a 
specified period. 
 
4. Methodology 
In the second part of my analysis I construct an international list of countries and study 
the propensity of women involvement in finance based on the country of domicile specific 
information (such as GDP, legal system – civil vs. common law countries, judicial protection of 
women), culture variables from Hofstede, and World Development Indicator variables (WDI) 
from the World Bank data report. In this section, the regression model follows the linear 
estimates model: 
Model 1:  
Female Participants (as % of workforce) = α + β1* WDI + β2*ln(GDP)+ β3*RuleofLaw + β4 * 
Hofstede1-6 + ε 
Model 2:  
Female Participants (as % of workforce) = α + β1* WDI + β2* RuleofLaw + β3*Quotas1-2 + 
β4*WEF1-5 + ε 
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5. Empirical Analysis 
 
In Table 1, I show the Summary Statistics for each indicator used in my regression models. 
Here, I find the mean, median, minimum and maximum for each set of data per indicator. My 
results showed that the mean for every indicator is similarly very close to its respective median. 
This indicates that there is not significant outliers in the data and confirms that my results are 
applicable to all indicators as the median complements the mean as a measure of central 
tendencies of our data set. Additionally, when analyzing the minimums and maximums of the 
data, we can see extreme differences across countries in the explanation of labor force 
participation rates. Within our data set, the minimum female labor force participation rate for a 
country is 24.96% and the maximum for a country is 68.99%. This implies that there is 
significant disparity in participation rates between countries and confirms the necessity of 
increasing rates on a global level. If labor force participation rates are high for women, then more 
women will be working and should eventually enter corporate boardrooms if there are no other 
barriers to female leadership. This suggests that economic and cultural factors may be important 
barriers to female career advancement. 
In Table 2, I use a Correlation Matrix to show how each of the indicators used are correlated 
with each other. Here we can see that long-term orientation and fertility rates are negatively 
correlated. However, amongst indulgent societies, they are positively correlated.  
To study the factors that determine women participation in the labor force around the 
world, I performed regression analysis and the results are presented in Tables 3 and 4 
respectively. Table 3 reflects Model #1 previously identified within my methodology. This table 
and its associated regression reflects my results for several variables – the dependent variable is 
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“women participation in the labor force” and the independent variables are two categories –1) 
measuring the legal system of the country of domicile - rule of law and 2) culture variables 
defined by Hofstede. Two cultural variables were statistically significant – Long-term 
Orientation (LTO) and Indulgence vs. Restraint (IVR). The results suggest that countries with a 
culture that supports long term orientation and goals are characterized with higher proportion of 
women in the labor force. LTO encourages thrifts and efforts in modern education as a way to 
prepare for the future. Additionally, a country with high levels of long-term orientation, rather 
than short-term, uphold a preference for delayed reward versus instant gratification. A high-
scoring country reflects that family is the basis of society, individuals are more likely to be 
married and have children, and education and training are highly valued. This outcome is well 
defined and explained by existing literature and supports a positive correlation with female labor 
force participation rates. These results also confirm prior literature regarding education’s impact 
to female labor force participation as educational attainment is a sound explanation for variations 
within the active female labor supply for a country. 
Also shown within Table 3: Model 1, I find strong statistical evidence that the relative 
measure of indulgence versus restraint is strongly statically significant, suggesting that countries 
that value indulgence over restraint have a higher percentage of women in the labor force. It is 
important to note that this is not an absolute variable, it is a relative measure that is used to 
compare societies. A country reflecting a high score in Indulgence indicates that the individuals 
of that culture reported higher feelings of happiness and contentment within their society. 
Indulgent societies are characterized with freedom of speech, in general people feel healthier and 
happier and interestingly, higher approval of foreign music and films is part of the survey 
questions used to create this score. Low scoring countries, or “Restraint” cultures, have strict 
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social norms to control gratification. Examples of countries with high scores of Indulgence are 
Sweden, Mexico, Australia and low scores – Egypt, India, and Russia. Therefore, my empirical 
results are consistent with the hypotheses that freedom of speech, general openness of the society 
and freedom of cultural norms creates a society that is more accepting of higher participation of 
women in the workforce. 
In Table 4, I study the role of several variables that characterize the societal norms of 
countries on the propensity of women to enter the labor force. The results are statistically 
significant and suggest that higher degree of economic participation, education, health and 
political environment are all associated with higher participation of women in the labor force. To 
proxy for levels of discrimination in the labor market for women, I chose to utilize the World 
Economic Forum’s sub-indices from the 2017 Global Gender Gap Report. This year’s analysis 
also reveals gender gaps at the industry level and highlights that even though qualified women 
are coming out of the education system, many industries are failing to hire, retain and promote 
them, losing out on a wealth of capacity. My findings are consistent with this outcome as all 
global gender gap indicators were statistically significant with labor force participation rates for 
females, those of which have had declining or stagnant growth more recently, according to recent 
data from the World Economic Forum. These results suggest that women participation is highly 
determined by the overall societal development. 
Interestingly, higher fertility rates are associated with higher female participation in the 
labor force. These results contribute to the argument that social norms determine the women 
participation in society and workforce. Also my results are consistent with the economic theory 
for fertility, suggesting that women do not have to choose between career and family, in fact, 
countries with higher fertility rates have also higher participation of women in the workforce. 
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6. Conclusion  
 
In summary, the goal of my research project was to review the existing literature that 
explains women participation in the work force and to contribute to the existing research by 
providing additional empirical analysis on factors that determine women involvement in the 
workforce around the world. I studied factors such as legal tradition, cultural characteristics and 
societal norms, health and development. My results are consistent with existing studies and 
confirm the hypotheses that better developed societies support more active participation of 
women within their society, families, and, collectively, within their societies 
In order to ensure the prosperity of our future global economies, we must develop and 
maintain economic systems that are both dynamic and all-inclusive. As our world moves into an 
era focused less on capitalism and more on talent at the individual level, the respective 
competitiveness that a country or corporation maintains will be largely determined by the 
innovative capacity of that entity. In this new context, it is imperative that we ensure equal 
opportunity to all so that we may fully exhaust our population’s intellectual resources that are 
critical to harnessing new opportunities, specifically those that lie within the differing ideas, 
perspectives, and skill sets of all individuals. As such, we must continue to work towards effort 
to increase the level of female participation in our global labor supply. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
  
 
Indicator	 Mean	 Median	 Minimum	 Maximum	
Labor	force	participation	rate,	female	(%	of	female	population	ages	15+)	 51.304	 52.152	 24.964	 68.989	
Fertility	rate,	total	(Births	per	woman)	 1.765	 1.640	 1.195	 2.958	
ln(GDP)	 26.611	 26.443	 23.810	 30.047	
Rule	of	Law	 0.615	 0.560	 -0.990	 1.950	
Power	Distance	Index	 58.486	 57.000	 11.000	 104.000	
Individualism	vs.	Collectivism	 49.514	 51.000	 14.000	 89.000	
Masculinity	vs.	Femininity	 53.135	 55.000	 5.000	 110.000	
Uncertainty	Avoidance	Index	 64.270	 65.000	 29.000	 95.000	
Long-term	Orientation	vs.	Short-term	Normative	Orientation	 53.809	 52.897	 12.594	 87.909	
Indulgence	vs.	Restraint	 42.415	 40.402	 12.946	 80.134	
Global	Gender	Gap	Score	 0.716	 0.719	 0.568	 0.878	
Economic	Participation	and	Opportunity	 0.652	 0.683	 0.274	 0.820	
Educational	Attainment	 0.979	 0.996	 0.819	 1.000	
Health	and	Survival	 0.973	 0.976	 0.918	 0.980	
Political	Empowerment	 0.260	 0.223	 0.019	 0.750	
Law	mandates	equal	remuneration	for	females	and	males	for	work	of	equal	value	(1=yes;	0=no)	 0.595	 N/A	 0.000	 1.000	
Mothers	are	guaranteed	an	equivalent	position	after	maternity	leave	(1=yes;	0=no)	 0.676	 N/A	 0.000	 1.000	
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
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Labor	force	participation	rate,	female	(%	of	female	population	ages	15+)	 1.000		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Fertility	rate,	total	(births	per	woman)	 -0.238	 1.000		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
ln(GDP)	 0.065	 -0.005	 1.000		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Rule	of	Law	 0.308	 -0.417	 0.153	 1.000		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Power	Distance	Index	 -0.369	 0.236	 0.025	 -0.740	 1.000		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Individualism	vs.	Collectivism	 0.164	 -0.298	 0.100	 0.703	 -0.639	 1.000		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Masculinity	vs.	Femininity	 -0.127	 -0.141	 0.324	 0.123	 0.091	 0.103	 1.000		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Uncertainty	Avoidance	Index	 -0.152	 -0.232	 -0.107	 -0.173	 0.090	 -0.055	 -0.018	 1.000		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Long-term	vs.	Short-term	Orientation	 0.188	 -0.538	 0.196	 0.043	 0.050	 0.168	 0.092	 0.096	 1.000		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Indulgence	vs.	Restraint	 0.370	 0.174	 0.185	 0.557	 -0.472	 0.232	 0.059	 -0.206	 -0.482	 1.000		 	 	 	 	 	 	
Global	Gender	Gap	Score	 0.038	 0.021	 -0.090	 -0.047	 0.048	 0.231	 0.130	 0.134	 -0.143	 -0.019	 1.000		 	 	 	 	 	
Economic	Participation	and	Opportunity	 0.030	 -0.039	 0.052	 0.008	 0.106	 0.234	 0.049	 0.024	 -0.062	 -0.094	 0.805	 1.000		 	 	 	 	
Educational	Attainment	 0.223	 -0.107	 0.282	 0.095	 0.066	 0.031	 0.201	 -0.033	 -0.071	 0.274	 0.253	 0.128	 1.000		 	 	 	
Health	and	Survival	 0.092	 -0.024	 0.018	 -0.134	 0.004	 0.152	 0.174	 -0.067	 0.114	 -0.200	 0.190	 0.113	 0.042	 1.000		 	 	
Political	Empowerment	 -0.021	 0.088	 -0.248	 -0.093	 -0.025	 0.164	 0.110	 0.204	 -0.165	 -0.007	 0.871	 0.443	 0.066	 0.140	 1.000		 	
Law	mandates	equal	remuneration	for	females	and	males	for	work	of	equal	value	 -0.205	 -0.020	 -0.324	 -0.019	 -0.055	 0.233	 0.116	 0.337	 -0.098	 -0.192	 0.225	 0.096	 0.180	 0.238	 0.224	 1.000		
Mothers	are	guaranteed	an	equivalent	position	after	maternity	leave	 0.114	 -0.151	 -0.342	 0.113	 -0.210	 0.386	 -0.287	 0.320	 -0.281	 0.166	 0.408	 0.362	 -0.011	 0.000	 0.359	 0.251	 1.000	
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Table 3: Model 1 Regression 
Female Participants (as % of workforce) = α + β1* WDI + β2*ln(GDP)+ β3*Civil + β4 * Hofstede1-6 + ε 
	 Coefficients	 t	Stat	 P-value	
Fertility	rate,	total	(Births	per	woman)	 -7.294	 -1.434	 0.163	
ln(GDP)	 -0.330	 -0.334	 0.741	
Rule	of	Law	 -4.692	 -1.406	 0.171	
Power	Distance	Index	 -0.114	 -1.230	 0.229	
Individualism	vs.	Collectivism	 -0.014	 -0.150	 0.882	
Masculinity	vs.	Femininity	 -0.066	 -0.999	 0.327	
Uncertainty	Avoidance	Index	 -0.077	 -1.135	 0.266	
Long-term	vs.	Short-term	Orientation**	 0.195	 2.225	 0.035**	
Indulgence	vs.	Restraint**	 0.333	 3.117	 0.004**	
	 	 	 	
**	Indicates	that	the	variable	is	statistically	significant	at	the	5%	level	(p-value	<	.05)	 	
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Table 4: Model 2 Regression 
Female Participants (as % of workforce) = α + β1* WDI + β2* Civil + β3*Quotas1-2 + β4*WEF1-5 + ε 
	 Coefficients	 t	Stat	 P-value	
Fertility	rate,	total**	 0.018	 2.466	 0.017	
Rule	of	Law	 -0.01	 -1.225	 0.225	
Law	mandates	equal	remuneration	for	females	and	males	for	work	of	equal	value	 -0.017	 -1.271	 0.208	
Mothers	are	guaranteed	an	equivalent	position	after	maternity	leave	 -0.012	 -0.836	 0.407	
Global	Gender	Gap	Score**	 -14.696	 -2.320	 0.024	
Economic	Participation	&	Opportunity**	 3.628	 2.298	 0.025	
Educational	Attainment**	 3.596	 2.265	 0.027	
Health	and	Survival**	 3.643	 2.243	 0.029	
Political	Empowerment**	 3.653	 2.301	 0.025	
	 	 	 	
**	Indicates	that	the	variable	is	statistically	significant	at	the	5%	level	(p-value	<	.05)	 	 	 	
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